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REMEDYING THE IRREMEDIABLE: THE
LESSONS OF GA UTREA UX
A. DAN TARLOCK*
The history of public housing in Chicago would have been different if
all units had been built as small projects, integrated into residential
communities.'
I. INTRODUCTION: FROM THE WARD HOUSE
TO THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE
Chicago is essentially a lawless city. The exercise of raw political
power by elected officials to override legal constraints on political choice
is the norm in a city where the culture of political power grips the imagi-
nation in a manner similar to the ultra chic in fashion in New York or
self-fulfillment in San Francisco. The consequences are both comic and
tragic. Political theater rivals watching the Cubs as a spectator sport, but
one of the major consequences is entrenched racial segregation and po-
larization that creates festering social problems.
The roots of the problem lie in the evolution of political power in
Chicago. Chicago never fully succumbed to the progressive notion of the
moral and efficient city, although ironically it was a major innovator and
exporter of the idea. 2 The Harrison administrations, supported by the
city's then large German population, created a modest good government
climate, but by and large the city remained free of the ideology of moral
uplift through scientific government. As the twentieth century unfolded,
the political power of the progressives diminished. By 1931 the Demo-
cratic Party had consolidated its power among both white ethnic and
* Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Stanford
University.
1. D. BOWLY, JR., THE POORHOUSE: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1895-1976, at 39
(1978).
2. Chicago became a model for the progressive notion of the grand, efficient city between the
1893 Columbian Exposition and the Burnham Plan for the city, which was drafted in 1905 and
carried out through the 1920s. However, Chicago never had wholesale political reform during this
period. As Professor Charles Merriam, a distinguished University of Chicago political scientist and
Chicago politician, observed of the tenure of Mayor Carter Harrison during the civil service and
reform period: "While he did not follow the lead of the reform forces, he did not as a rule antago-
nize them, and on the whole prevented the drift of the city into hands of the spoilsmen of the worst
type." C. MERRIAM, CHICAGO: A MORE INTIMATE VIEW OF URBAN POLITICS 21 (1929). See
also W. STUART, THE TWENTY INCREDIBLE YEARS (1935).
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black voters,3 and the city lapsed into a municipal version of a feudal
society. Blacks and large blocks of white ethnic voters switched to the
Democratic Party4 to create the fabled and celebrated "machine." 5
Under the machine, power in Chicago has historically been exercised at
the ward level by various ethnic chiefs. Ward prerogatives were some-
what curbed by Mayor Daley, 6 but this tradition cemented ethnic politics
as the politics of the city. As Charles Merriam observed: "The feudal
organization of Chicago and its feudal party system ... present a unique
picture of political organization and control, a background upon which
strange political events might well be thrown."
' 7
Chicago has paid a high price for the creation of a municipal federa-
tion. Racial discrimination, especially in housing, became an integral
part of municipal policy, and the city's political institutions resisted pres-
sures to project a more integrated city. As the political machine failed to
respond rapidly enough to the changing racial character of the city, 8 the
federal courts began to hear a number of law suits that challenged the
traditional exercise of political power in the city. A series of well-
planned cases pitted the national or aspirational 9 vision of constitutional
rights for minorities, which were the victims of political discrimination,10
against the tradition of the division of the city into ethnic enclaves. The
sad history of public housing in Chicago is a prime example of this con-
flict and raises troubling questions about the use of "institutional" litiga-
tion to reallocate political power and the resources that support it.
In the past twenty years, courts have become vehicles for structural
3. See P. KLEPPNER, CHICAGO DIVIDED: THE MAKING OF A BLACK MAYOR 22-26 (1985).
The switch of black voters from the Republican to the Democratic party was both a function of the
fundamental political shift caused by the depression and the New Deal and the efforts of Mayors
Cermack and Kelly to construct a parallel black political machine. See also R. BILES, BIG CITY
Boss IN DEPRESSION AND WAR: MAYOR EDWARD J. KELLY OF CHICAGO 89-102 (1984).
4. This development is traced in Zikmund II, Mayoral Voting and Ethnic Politics in the Daley-
Bilandic-Byrne Era, in AFTER DALEY: CHICAGO POLITICS IN TRANSITION 27 (S. Grove & L.
Masotti eds. 1982) [hereinafter AFTER DALEY].
5. See M. ROYKO, Boss (1971).
6. The best account of the Daley administration is M. RAKOVE, DON'T MAKE No WAVES,
DON'T BACK No LOSERS (1975).
7. C. MERRIAM, supra note 2, at 100.
8. The sources of black voters who supported the Daley machine are described in Grimshaw,
The Daley Legacy: A Declining Politics of Party, Race and Public Unions, in AFTER DALEY, supra
note 5, at 57 and W. GRIMSHAW, BLACK POLITICS IN CHICAGO: THE QUEST FOR LEADERSHIP,
1939-1979 (1980).
9. Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531 (1988) (Professor
Shane's article appears in this symposium issue).
10. This vision traces its roots to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). The basis of the Court's continued invalidation of racial segregation has been the subject of
considerable debate, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 639-41 (1 1th ed. 1985), but the idea
that blacks remain at risk from the tyranny of the majority remains a central idea of modem consti-
tutional law. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
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reform of society. The public law model advocates long-term judicial
involvement in defining remedies for some of society's deepest injus-
tices."1 Public law litigation is brought on behalf of a large class of ag-
grieved individuals. As a result, the litigation often opens a large gap
between the underlying right abridged and the necessary remedy to se-
cure some meaningful enjoyment of the right by the injured class. This
gap calls into question the wisdom of the public law litigation, 12 and the
Gautreaux decision shows the pitfalls of trying to use a deeply flawed
social program to achieve the broader goal of racial integration. Judicial
approaches designed to promote racial equality work less well, if at all,
when racial discrimination is intertwined with a flawed program of
wealth redistribution.
Chicago is a perfect case study to evaluate institutional litigation
because the public litigation analyzed in this Symposium vested a per-
haps unprecedented amount of political power in a most unlikely
unelected institution, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Fed-
eral District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The role of these
courts in reforming the basic institutions of government is an especially
interesting case study in the ability of public litigation to reform a com-
munity for three reasons. First, the degree of involvement by one court
in one city is as great or greater than any other circuit and city in the
country.' 3 Second, among the institutions of the city, only the Seventh
Circuit has consistently adhered to the progressive vision of an efficient,
noncorrupt city governed by national constitutional norms. Third, in
contrast to the other two Seventh Circuit reforms examined in this Sym-
posium, the public housing litigation did not involve access to the polit-
ical process but the redesign of a deeply flawed redistributive program.
II. GAUTREAUX: A CASE WAITING TO HAPPEN
Alexander Polikofls 14 and Peter Shane's 5 reviews of the Gautreaux
litigation to desegregate public housing in the city raise a particularly
significant example of the limits of institutional litigation. The gap be-
11. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) is
the classic exposition of the difference between the use of litigation to vindicate an individual interest
and to advance the legal and thus political power of a disadvantaged group.
12. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 596-98 (1983) for a concise sum-
mary of the remedial limitations debate and literature.
13. The only other comparable instance is the role of the First Circuit in governing Boston. See
J.A. LUCAS, THE COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF THREE AMERI-
CAN FAMILIES (1985).
14. Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451 (1988) (Mr
Polikoff's article appears in this symposium issue).
15. Shane, supra note 9.
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tween the City's exercise of political power and constitutional norms is
great, but an effective remedy has proved ever more intractable. The
merits of the underlying claim are clear and uncomplicated. Chicago has
long been a model for racial segregation. Before World War II private
restrictive covenants confined the "Black Belt"-after the war, urban re-
newal and public housing location became national models for the con-
trol of racial migration 16 and the effort continues today. 17 The City's use
of the public housing siting process is a classic and well-documented case
of purposeful racial discrimination.' But, in the end, the Gautreaux liti-
gation is a classic example of the inability of the judiciary to remedy
effectively racial discrimination that is deeply rooted in the history and
culture of a community.
Gautreaux was a case waiting to happen. The immediate cause was
the termination of the Chicago Housing Authority's quota system for
projects, but the roots lay in the bitter City opposition to the efforts of the
Chicago Housing Authority to disperse project sites. After the defeat of
Mayor Kelly, who protected the CHA, anti-CHA forces on the City
Council succeeded in giving the City Council the power to approve pro-
ject site selection. 19 Long before the litigation, two distinguished polit-
ical scientists had documented the racial discrimination in their study of
the aldermanic veto system that ensured (and continues to ensure) that
nothing comes into a ward unless the alderman wants it there.20 In
short, through public housing site selection, Chicago practiced racial
zoning for the poor. There was nothing novel about the claim that segre-
gation violated the resident's right to equal protection. At the height of
Plessy v. Ferguson,21 the Supreme Court held that racial zoning was un-
constitutional, 22 and racial segregation had no constitutional footing af-
16. The fullest development of this thesis is A. HIRSCH, THE MAKING OF THE SECOND
GHETro: RACE AND PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940-1960 (1983). See also 0. DUNCAN & B.
DUNCAN, THE NEGRO POPULATION OF CHICAGO: A STUDY IN RESIDENTIAL SECESSION (1957).
17. The latest technique is home equity assurance which allows neighborhoods to tax them-
selves to establish insurance pools. The proceeds would be used to buy homes at prices set by an
oversight committee when a home owner wants to sell but is offered a price lower than the value
fixed by the oversight committee. 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. 85-1044 (West).
18. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
19. See A. HIRSCH, supra note 16.
20. M. MEYERSON & E. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
CASE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (1955).
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
22. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Mr. Justice Day reasoned that "[lthe right which
the ordinance annulled was the civil right of a white man to dispose of his property as he saw fit to




ter Brown v. Board of Education.23 Once the politics of public housing
site selection were demonstrated, the finding of racial discrimination was
easy.
24
The sad conclusion of Mr. Polikoff's assessment of the litigation is
that the Seventh Circuit's efforts to make the City comply with national
constitutional norms has been, with the exception of the Section 8 disper-
sion program, a failure compared to their more ambitious attempts to
govern the city through the control of patronage and the reapportion-
ment of ward map boundaries. Both Mr. Polikoff and Professor Shane
acknowledge the failure of the remedial approaches attempted by the
court, but argue that the ability to remedy the remedy problem still lies
with the courts. Mr. Polikoff identifies the failure of the Supreme Court
to require metropolitan remedies for education and housing segregation
as the major reason for the failure of the litigation.25 Professor Shane
seems to go further, arguing that the remedies failed because the courts
did not intervene more aggressively to modify the behavior of the institu-
tions that caused the discrimination.
26
There is a different interpretation of the case. Gautreaux is a classic
case of resistance to a remedial scheme by those with the most to lose
from it-white ethnics who chose to or were forced to remain in the city
when many of their kin fled to the suburbs. Classic constitutional law
accords no weight to distaste for the exercise of constitutional rights
27
and Polikoff follows this tradition. Instead, he assigns the major weight
for the failure of the litigation to the Supreme Court's refusal to reverse
its decision in Milliken v. Bradley28 and develop an effective metropoli-
tan-wide remedy. Gautreaux produced a narrow exception to Milliken.
Hill v. Gautreaux 29 approved a metropolitan remedy against the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development and the CHA, but the case did
not provide a "realistic" metropolitan remedy. Polikoff is correct that
the Milliken Court's theory of intrastate federalism has no foundation,
30
but this is only the starting point for the analysis of the remedial issue.
One of the lessons of Gautreaux is that institutional litigation may re-
quire the plaintiffs and court to make a hard choice between goals. Pub-
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
25. Polikoff, supra note 14.
26. Shane, supra note 9, at 569-71.
27. See Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the 1980's, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 947, 989-90 (1985).
28. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
29. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
30. See generally Rudenstine, Judicially Ordered Social Reform: Neofederalism and Neonation-
alism and the Debate Over Political Structure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 449 (1986).
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lic housing provides both an unacceptable level of housing quality and
racially segregated housing, but the solution for the first problem may
not produce the level of racial integration implicit in the aspirational vi-
sion of the fourteenth amendment.
III. SOME CONSTITUTIONAL HERESY ON REMEDIES
Gautreaux raises questions about the relationship between a pro-
posed remedy and the institutional setting that both caused the discrimi-
nation and must remedy it. Exclusionary zoning litigation has made us
acutely aware of the limitations of the judiciary to impose structural rem-
edies that require the redistribution of wealth. Gautreaux was premised
on the assumption that federal housing subsidies would create a real al-
ternative to the high-rise ghettos and the subsidies failed to materialize in
the amounts necessary. Gautreaux is at bottom a case about the redistri-
bution of wealth; the limitations of constitutional adjudication to do this
remain central to understanding the failure of the litigation to achieve its
objective. In addition to this familiar and over-arching problem, the liti-
gation reveals a series of related problems that advocates of institutional
litigation must confront.
The major lesson that one can draw from Gautreaux is that we must
recognize the concept of imperfect remedies. Roman law recognized the
concept of an imperfect obligation, a principle that expressed the desires
of political superiors but carried with it no sanction. Modem jurispru-
dence does not recognize such obligations; we have agreed with John
Austin that "an imperfect law is not so properly a law."131 This is espe-
cially so in the United States as our distinctive contribution to modem
jurisprudence has been to make judges rather than legislators the princi-
ple source of the law. 32 The idea of perfect judge-made law led directly
to the notion that any right declared by a court can be remedied by it.
Gautreaux suggests a need to reexamine our rejection of these concep-
tions of law when the issue is more wealth distribution than access to the
political process.
33
The root of the problem is that remedial resistance to institutional
31. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 3d
ed. 1968) (1st ed. 1832).
32. The idea can be traced to Bodin, see C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTOR-
ICAL PERSPECTIVE 62 (1958), but the idea was given its first full expression by John Chipman Gray
in THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909).
33. See Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and
Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657 (1988) for a rearticulation of the argument that the primary




litigation must be considered relevant. Otherwise, the remedy will not
vindicate the right. There has been a tendency for courts to trim the
right to fit the remedy, thus diluting the force of the underlying right.
3 4
Community avoidance becomes easier, in part, because the unconstitu-
tional conduct has been limited and incentives for bolder political re-
sponses have been lessened. Institutional litigation must be distinguished
from other types of constitutional adjudication such as free speech cases.
In the latter, the hostility of the audience to the message is largely irrele-
vant 35 unless the audience is a captive. 36 The celebrated march by neo-
Nazis in the northern suburb of Skokie, where many holocaust survivors
live, exemplifies this. A judicial order allowing the march can be en-
forced, with the usual police protection, no matter how intense the oppo-
sition to the march.
37
Even in the free speech area there is precedent for considering the
relevance of resistance. For example, as the force of the right decreases,
the audience reaction to the exercise of their right becomes relevant in
deciding how much of the speech to permit.3 8 The principle, debatable
as it is at the right declaration stage, takes on greater legitimacy at the
remedy selection stage of the litigation. Unless the political institutions
become involved in the problems that caused the litigation and the need
for an institutional remedy, in the end the inherent limitations of the
judicial power will produce a superficial solution.
Gautreaux raises at least four limitations that are inherent in the
effort to remedy any truly bad social problem-both from the general
fiscal concerns raised by any institutional litigation as well as from the
special nature of low income housing policies. Some limitations may be
peculiar to Chicago but, by and large, the problems will be faced by at-
tempts to use litigation to reform the provision of public subsidies in any
metropolitan area.
34. See Note, Judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE LJ. 1741
(1985).
35. Not surprisingly, the leading case, Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), arose
from the decision by the Chicago police to control a school segregation protest demonstration by
ordering the demonstrators to disperse.
36. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205 (1975).
37. This is the ultimate lesson of the state and federal litigation precipitated by the efforts of the
Village of Skokie to prevent the marches. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 1237-40 for a review
and analysis of the litigation.
38. The prime example is the regulation of obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),
but the Court has also applied the concept to offensive speech such as protected "adult entertain-
ment," Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and comic monologues filled with
"dirty" words, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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A. The Depth of Structural Defects in the Program
Post-World War II public housing suffers from two major defects
that to date defy solution. Originally public housing was intended as a
way station for those on their way out of poverty. Yet the program soon
became a permanent way of life by those unable to escape the trap of
poverty. Putting tenants in high-rises made the problem worse. The
early decision to build stark uniform buildings separated from the sur-
rounding neighborhood reached its apogee in Chicago with the construc-
tion of projects such as the Robert Taylor Homes (the largest public
housing project in the world), Cabrini Green and the Henry Homer
Homes, that represent the perversion of every ideal of the welfare state.
3 9
The result was to concentrate the poor in new ghettos that aggravated
every preexisting social problem. As the 1968 Douglas Commission ob-
served, "[i]n most instances, a project has become little more than an
institution for the ill and subnormal, but without the institutional care
they need." 4
Gautreaux was an honorable effort to return public housing to its
original purpose, but the structure of the public housing program was
too flawed to permit any reform. Scattered site housing is intended to
integrate low income families into a neighborhood, but by the time of
Gautreaux, public housing had become so associated with publicly fi-
nanced ghettos that the idea of any type of public housing had become
unacceptable to all neighborhoods. 41 Public housing represented a pow-
erful, alien force to the surrounding community; its image could not be
easily manipulated by changing the design of the structures. No federal
housing subsidy or other program was designed to deal realistically with
the reasons for neighborhood resistance.
B. The Sophistication of the Remedy
The deeper the underlying social problem, the more sophisticated
the remedy must be. This poses a paradox for courts because effective
remedies must often violate the basic norms of equality and neutrality
that constrain courts. This is illustrated by the difference between what
Mr. Polikoff would have liked the court to do and other housing reme-
39. See D. BOWLY, JR., supra note 1, at 111-35; R. STRUYK, A NEW SYSTEM FOR PUBLIC
HOUSING: SALVAGING A NATIONAL RESOURCE (1980).
40. NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 111 (1968).
41. See Williams, The Dual Housing Market in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, in HOUSING:
CHICAGO STYLE 38 (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 1982) for a brief discussion of the limited efforts
of Gautreaux orders and related efforts to scatter public housing and federally subsidized housing
throughout Chicago and the suburbs.
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dies. Mr. Polikoff is, of course, correct to identify residential segregation
as a metropolitan-wide problem and metropolitan remedies would meet
Professor Shane's third criteria for an effective remedy, the "implicat[ion
of] groups other than the plaintiff group in the fate of the plaintiff
group," as well as his fifth and sixth.42 The rub is that any judicial rem-
edy is unlikely to meet Professor Shane's other criteria which are neces-
sary conditions 'for an effective remedy.
In 1973, the respected political economist and real estate developer
Anthony Downs responded to the mounting concern over the lack of
racial integration in the suburbs with a provocative book, Opening Up the
Suburbs.43 To integrate the suburbs, he proposed an ingenious but per-
haps "ethically outlandish" 44 decentralized plan to overcome the social
objections to the dispersion of racial minorities. Metropolitan areas
would be divided into equal commuting zones so that each community
would have to take its share of an assigned risk pool. The number of low
income children attending public school in each zone would be limited to
twenty-five percent of the total school population. Relocated families
would be screened to minimize problem families. Interestingly, the most
successful program to spur the construction of low and moderate income
housing has taken the Downs assigned risk idea one step further.
New Jersey has had almost two decades of experience dealing with
judicial mandates ordering communities to provide low and moderate
income housing, i.e., racial and social integration, and the state's experi-
ence illustrates the sophistication required for an effective remedy. In
two path-breaking decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that
each municipality must take its fair share of regional growth,45 including
needed low and moderate income housing. Little was done until the
state legislature struck an innovative compromise between aspirational
equality and the reality of the problem. A community may partially opt
out of its fair share obligation for money. A municipality may enter into
a Regional Contribution Agreement with another under which the
"host" municipality agrees to accept one-half of the "exporter's" fair
share obligation.46 Newark is undergoing a significant construction
boom as a result. Whatever the moral objections, such bribes are an ef-
fective way of solving the key defect in any judicial remedy. Courts can-
42. Shane, supra note 9, at 566.
43. A. DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS (1973).
44. Tarlock, Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 637, 639 (1974).
45. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d
390 (1983).
46. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301, 312 (West 1986).
19881
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not directly and systematically distribute wealth, but this is exactly what
the regional cooperation agreements do in a manner superior to indirect
judicial attempts to do so.
C. The Comparative Advantage of Market Solutions
Market solutions are not appropriate for many constitutional viola-
tions, but they are for racial discrimination in the location of public hous-
ing. The reason is simply that absent government subsidization of low
income housing, they are the only attractive alternative. Market solu-
tions also have the advantage of getting to the root of the problem. For
example, the recent report of the President's Commission on Privatiza-
tion concludes "that it no longer makes sense to maintain public housing
at some sites. Demolition of some projects will save the government
unacceptably high future costs of rehabilitation. '47 The revenues from
the sale of existing public housing projects, many of them in the path of
rapidly revitalizing areas, could be used to support a housing voucher
system to relocate those displaced by project demolition and sale.
Any market solution must, of course, be closely monitored. Public
urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s largely ignored the relocation
problem until it was too late. It would be a tragedy to repeat this mis-
take. Thus, market solutions have to be carefully evaluated to ensure
that those displaced by a solution actually receive a subsidy, through
vouchers or otherwise, that make some degree of housing choice possible.
Public approval of private projects built on the demolished sites would be
an appropriate occasion to use "linkage" 48 to provide replacement
housing.
D. The Stickiness and Perverseness of Political Resistance
Political resistance to racial integration is a given; almost every rem-
edy will have to be enforced in the face of hostile opposition. The prob-
lem is to decide which remedies to enforce in light of the impact of the
remedy on the fabric of other political institutions. It is appropriate for a
court to penalize resistance, as a federal district judge did in the Yonkers,
47. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD
MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 22 (1988).
48. Linkage refers to the widespread practice of tying government land use approvals, zoning
and subdivision controls, to the developer's willingness to agree to conditions imposed by the city to
redistribute wealth. Cities have long used linkage to compel developers to set aside a percentage of
units in a project for low and moderate income families. See generally Exactions. A Controversial
New Sourcefor Municipal Funds, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1987).
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New York housing desegregation litigation,49 but subsequent develop-
ments in Chicago raise the question of whether the judicial stance should
be the same if the resistance comes also from the protected minority. At
a minimum, twists such as this suggest the need for the court to monitor
and reevaluate any complex remedy that it implements.
After Gautreaux other suits were filed in Chicago to open up the
political process to blacks and Hispanics. These suits along with popula-
tion trends accomplished the transfer of political power to the very mi-
norities victimized in Gautreaux. Ironically, this ballot box remedy
seems to have made the underlying problem worse. In late August of
1988, the Chicago Tribune reported that a plan to replace an existing
high-rise project with a new 6000 unit townhouse and low-rise project
(combining 900 publicly owned units scattered among the other 5100
units) was opposed by the ward's alderman, a candidate for mayor.50 He
wants the existing project rehabilitated to keep an existing solid black
voting block in place; the fear is that blacks will be partially displaced by
whites.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Gautreaux litigation suggests that the law of constitutional rem-
edies that require fundamental modification of the culture, political
power and resources of a community must explicitly recognize that the
community's political institutions must play a major role in the imple-
mentation of the remedy. This is constitutional heresy to those schooled
in the role of the Supreme Court in confronting segregation because it
could allow political resistance to override fundamental rights. How-
ever, this is not a theory of judicial abdication of judicial responsibility to
hold government to the highest standard of the constitutional ideal of
racial neutrality. Instead, it is a plea for a notion of remedies that take
account of the full institutional limitations of what a court is being asked
to do.
Courts have a major role to play in the process of defining basic
community norms through the administration of justice. Ultimately,
however, when the issue is more complex than the declaration of a funda-
mental right, decisions about how to share power and resources among
different constituencies must come through the political process. A com-
munity's political institutions, no matter how imperfect and corrupt they
49. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The contempt
order is unpublished.
50. McCarron, Votes Give CHA Slums a Reason for Life, Chi. Trib., Aug. 30, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
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may be, have the primary responsibility to support the commands of the
Constitution with action and resources. Thus, in some institutional liti-
gation settings the judiciary must act more like the old testament
prophets. Courts are a voice of national moral vision when they adjudi-
cate cases of racial discrimination, but ultimately they are a voice forcing
the community to confront and remedy its short-comings rather than a
complete engine of rectitude.
